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The Return of State Remedies in Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: Trends in Developing Countries
Sonia E. Rolland*
This Article explores the variety of strategies deployed by developing
countries to bypass traditional investor-state arbitration and assesses
the limitations and drawbacks of these efforts. From giving
preeminence to domestic courts of the host state to the resurgence of
diplomatic protection and other state-based processes for solving
investment disputes, these tactics are reminiscent of the pre-bilateral
investment treaty era, where states played a more prominent role in
foreign investment dispute resolution. The main proponents of such
moves are Brazil, India, UNASUR, South Africa, and Indonesia. After
an overview of initiatives from these countries, this Article analyzes the
hurdles and limitations of state-centric dispute resolution. It concludes
that relying purely on state remedies is unlikely to fully address
investor-state dispute resolution, although it may increase the pressure
to critically reassess the current investor-state arbitration system.
Ultimately, this Article frames the return to state-controlled dispute
settlement mechanisms as part of a broader trend to reassert host
states’ control of foreign investment policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Amidst heated critiques of investor-state arbitrations and proposals
for alternative venues, such as a court of arbitration, developing
countries are advocating for a redraft and reinterpretation of a number
of traditional bilateral investment treaties’ (“BIT”) features. These
include the definition of investors and investment, the types of
protections afforded to investors, the obligations of investors toward
home and host states, exceptions to treaty obligations to preserve host
states’ domestic regulatory autonomy, more stringent procedures
regarding investment arbitration, and disclosure of conflicts of interest
by arbitrators. Additionally, some emerging countries have taken even
more radical positions and rejected or heavily restricted investor-state
arbitration altogether. Some of these states are opting for a return to
diplomatic protection and other state-based processes for solving
investment disputes. The move may seem anachronistic. Does it merely
reflect a reactionary position caused by some emerging countries’ deep
disenchantment with international investment law? This Article argues
that the return to state-controlled dispute settlement mechanisms may be
framed as part of a broader trend to reassert host states’ control of
foreign investment policy.
This Article first explores the variety of tactics deployed by
developing countries to bypass traditional investor-state arbitration and
then assesses the limitations and drawbacks of these efforts.
I. BYPASSING INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
Investor-state arbitrations under the auspices of the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention
or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) and other similar frameworks have come under fire
from states, whether developed or developing, civil society, and local
communities. Critiques leveled at such arbitrations are both procedural
and substantive. On the procedural front, the lack of clear and
universally accepted codes of conduct and ethics rules for arbitrators
has left the practicing world vulnerable to accusations of conflicts of
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interest, clientelism, and other biases.1 The cost of the process is another
concern for low-income developing countries and even middle-income
emerging powers.2 Civil society advocates lament the opacity of the
process and their lack of standing to participate when a foreign
investor’s activities have a deleterious impact on the public interest, a
local community, or a vulnerable ecosystem that the state is either
unable or unwilling to protect.3
With respect to substantive law, issues of consistency across
arbitrations addressing similar issues, differing interpretations regarding
the scope and meaning of treaty terms that are identical across large
numbers of BITs,4 a growing imbalance between shrinking state options
to exert their sovereign regulatory prerogatives and expansive
interpretations of investor rights, protections and privileges,5
opportunities for treaty-shopping by investors using fluid corporate
structures, inadequate account of spill-over effects from investment
1. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the “Invisible
College” of International Arbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 496–97 (2015)
(identifying the characteristics of the practicing bar involved in international arbitration).
2. See, e.g., Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, The Challenge of UNASUR Member Countries to Replace
ICSID Arbitration, 2 BEIJING L. REV. 134, 134 (2011) (discussing myriad complaints and
concerns of Latin American countries with ICSID).
3. See, e.g., TRANSFORMING THE IIA REGIME: EXITING THE UNNECESSARY, DAMAGING
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (UNCTAD World Investment Forum, Feb. 20,
2014),
http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Public-CitizenDraft.pdf; Civil Society Groups Say “No” to Investors Suing States in RCEP, PUBLIC SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.world-psi.org/en/civil-society-groups-say-noinvestors-suing-states-rcep.
4. See generally Julie A. Maupin, MFN-based Jurisdiction in Investor-State Arbitration: Is
There Any Hope for a Consistent Approach?, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 157 (2011). The novel
approach to most-favored nation clauses in relation to consent to arbitration was developed in
Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award of the
Tribunal (Nov. 13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002), which was followed by arbitrators in
Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug.
3, 2004). See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on
Jurisdiction (May 16, 2006); Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (June 17, 2005).
But other awards declined to follow the Maffezini approach: Telenor Mobile Communications
A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB 04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006); Plama
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Feb. 8 2005); Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction (Nov. 29, 2004).
5. MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 44–45, 201 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2015); Frank J. Garcia et al.,
Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 861, 869–70 (2015); see also Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., “Indirect
Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law 2 (OECD Working
Papers on Int'l Inv., Paper No. 4, 2004) (discussing indirect expropriation as one of the options
available to states).
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arbitrations into the realm of trade law, financial and monetary policy,
and international taxation regulation, very large awards or the potential
thereof are but a few of the most often-mentioned debates.6
In response, developing countries are pursuing a variety of tactics to
bypass investor-state arbitration in hopes of gaining better control over
the process and substantive law. These fall mainly in two categories:
giving preeminence to domestic courts of the host state (Part A) and
relying on state-to-state processes for resolving investor claims (Part B).
A. Relying on Domestic Remedies
Historically, most BITs have included a “fork in the road” provision
allowing investors to pursue either domestic judicial remedies in the
host country or international arbitration.7 In practice, foreign investors
demonstrate an overwhelming preference for international arbitration. In
contrast, BITs do not grant host states the right to request international
arbitration proceedings against a foreign investor. The host state is
therefore limited to seeking whatever domestic administrative and
judicial remedies may be contractually available between the investor
and state agencies or as a matter of general law in that country. Most
BITs also provide a state-to-state international arbitration opportunity
should the state parties have a disagreement on the interpretation and
application of the treaty that cannot be resolved through negotiations.
Lastly, domestic constituencies have no legal recourse under BITs
and may vindicate their grievances through domestic judicial and
administrative avenues if the legal system provides them with standing
and claims. In some limited cases, individuals and communities have
sought remedies in the foreign investor’s home country if that state
offered a suitable avenue for doing so. The Alien Torts Claim Act, in
the United States, has been used for that purpose over the past two
decades, but the Supreme Court has now severely limited the statute’s

6. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa
E. Sachs eds., 2009); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521
(2005); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Rules of the International Trade, Investment and Financial
Systems: What They Deliver, how they Differ, the way Forward 17 J. INT’L ECON. L 833 (2014);
Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POL. 1 (2010); Roeline Knottnerus & Roos van
Os, The Netherlands: A Gateway to ′Treaty Shopping′ for Investment Protection, INV. TREATY
NEWS (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/01/12/the-netherlands-treaty-shopping/.
7. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 216–17 (2008); Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods,
Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 231, 239–49 (2004).
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jurisdictional scope (ratione personae and ratione materiae).8
A number of countries are now seeking to reinforce the role of
domestic courts in resolving investment claims. They also seek to
protect the finality of domestic court judgments and administrative
decisions against subsequent arbitral claims that an investor might make
to effectively overrule domestic decisions. This Part presents the
examples of India, UNASUR countries, Indonesia, and South Africa to
illustrate this trend.
i. India
While not radically opposed to the traditional investor-state
arbitration system, India’s new model BIT reflects concerns born out of
recent arbitral setbacks that were perceived to undermine the authority
of Indian courts.9
The restrictive nature of ISDS under the 2016 Indian Model BIT
comes from the interaction of three requirements: exhaustion of
domestic remedies, immunity of domestic court decisions, and India not
being a party to the ICSID Convention.
First, the Model requires investors to exhaust remedies available
under domestic law that cover “the same measure or similar factual
matters for which a breach of [the] Treaty is claimed”10 for at least five
years from the date when the investor first knew of the measure11 before
proceeding with investor-state arbitration under the BIT. If no domestic
recourse exists or no resolution is reached within the five-year period,
investors may proceed to arbitration but effectively only have a sixmonth window to trigger the process.12
Second, the Model BIT states that arbitration tribunals lack the

8. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 727–28 (2004).
9. In 2012, India received an unfavorable decision in White Industries Australia Ltd. v. The
Republic of India. See White Indus. Australia Ltd. v. The Republic of India, Final Award,
UNCITRAL (Nov. 30, 2011). This decision, which was based on delays in the Indian judiciary,
caused a major stir in India. It is also thought to be the first arbitral award against India. Prabhash
Ranjan, The White Industries Arbitration: Implications for India’s Investment Treaty Program,
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/thewhite-industries-arbitration-implications-for-indias-investment-treaty-program/. Shortly after it
was decided, India received another seventeen notices of dispute over claims ranging from the
cancellation of licenses to the review of Supreme Court decisions. Grant Hanessian & Kabir
Duggal, The 2015 India Model BIT: Is This the Change the World Wishes to See?, 32 ICSID REV.
– FOREIGN INV. L.J. 216 (2017).
10. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, pmbl., art. 15.1 (adopted Jan. 14,
2016) [hereinafter 2016 India Model BIT].
11. Id. at art. 15.2.
12. Id. at arts. 15.2, 15.4, 15.5 (i).
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jurisdiction to “review the merits of a decision made by a judicial
authority of the Parties.”13
Third, the 2016 Model BIT allows arbitrations under the ICSID
Convention “provided that both the Parties are full members of the
Convention.”14 However, India is not a party to the ICSID Convention.
This provision, then, means that in practice, investors are barred from
bringing arbitration proceedings under ICSID until India accedes to the
ICSID Convention (and assuming that their state of origin is also a party
to the Convention). When the Indian government launched a working
group to renegotiate India’s BITs in 2013, some argued in favor of
joining the Convention.15 While the provision suggests that India may
consider doing so in the future, there is no indication of such a move at
present. Perhaps as a stop-gap measure, or to mollify those who would
be wary of the inapplicability of ICSID, the 2016 Model BIT allows
arbitrations under the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, intended to
cover situations where one of the states, but not both, is a party to the
ICSID Convention. The application of the ICSID Convention is still
excluded and the proceedings are instead governed by the Additional
Facility Rules.16 Other processes (such as the Permanent Court of
Arbitration) and rules (such as UNCITRAL) may also be used for
investor-state arbitration.
In practice, then, it appears that investors must first vindicate their
grievances in Indian courts. If they win, they will not need ISDS. If they
lose, they will be precluded from resorting to ISDS on those same facts
because the tribunal cannot take up an issue once it is decided by a
court. With India terminating BITs with a slew of countries since
2016,17 the Model BIT gives important indications of the direction that
India might seek in the negotiations of its future BITs and free trade
agreements chapters. Some countries have gone further and are
implementing rules to exclude investor-state arbitration altogether.

13. Id. at art. 13.5.
14. Id. at art. 16.1.
15. Abhinav Goel, Protecting foreign investment, INDIAN EXPRESS (Aug. 27, 2013, 3:11 AM),
http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/protecting-foreign-investment/1160596/0.
16. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Additional Facility
Rules, art. 3 (Apr. 2006); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)
Convention, Regulations and Rules, art. 25(1) (Apr. 2006).
17. Nicholas Peacock & Nihal Joseph, Mixed Messages to Investors as India Quietly
Terminates Bilateral Investment Treaties with 58 Countries, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS:
ARBITRATION
NOTES
(Mar.
16,
2017,
2:42
PM),
http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietlyterminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-58-countries/.
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ii. The Union of South American Nations (“UNASUR”)
UNASUR countries have declared their opposition to ICSID as a
forum and some members have sought to develop an alternative arbitral
forum in Latin America. A subset of Latin American countries has been
more radical in its opposition to traditional ISDS as illustrated by the
“Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America” (“ALBA”)’s
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty (“TCP”) affirming
“[t]he exigency that foreign investment respects national laws. Unlike
FTAs which impose a series of advantages and guarantees in favour of
transnational companies, the TCP looks for a foreign investment that it
respects the laws, reinvest the utilities and solves any controversy with
the State like any national investor.”18 Bolivia and Ecuador, two
member countries of ALBA and TCP, now have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the respective governments from entering into
treaties where the domestic judiciary would be displaced by
international arbitration.19
iii. South Africa
In the period following the end of apartheid, South Africa entered
into a flurry of BITs without really considering the long-term effects
thereof.20 It was only after the first claim by a foreign investor, in the
2007 Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa case, that the
implications of BITs received necessary scrutiny. 21 As a result of the
Foresti claim, South Africa embarked on a process of reviewing its
BITs. South Africa found that most of the BITs it had entered into did
not accord with its Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) policy or even
with its constitutional mandate, particularly relating to post-apartheid
Black empowerment policies.22 It also found no direct link between a
18. Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty, BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE
PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA 16, http://alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/governing-principles-tcp.
19. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR 2008, Sept. 2008, art. 422;
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO, Feb. 7, 2009, art. 366 (Bol.); see also INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 180–81 (Attila Tanzi et al.
eds., 2016) (discussing the reemergence of the exhaustion of local remedies rule).
20. Mohammed Mossallem, Process Matters: South Africa’s Experience Exiting its BITs 7
(The Global Economic Governance Programme, University of Oxford, Working Paper No. 97,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2562417.
21. Id. at 7, 10.
22. South African Department of Trade and Industry, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy
Framework Review 11 (Position Paper, June 2009), http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west1.amazonaws.com/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf; see also Jonathan Lang, Bilateral
Investment Treaties – a shield or a sword?, BOWMAN GILLIFAN (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-African-GovernmentCanceling-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.pdf (detailing the findings of South Africa’s Department
of Trade and Industry’s (“DTI”) official review of BITs in 2010 and the recommendations made
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BIT with a particular country and the flow of FDI from that country.23
Between 2011 and 2014 South Africa gave notice of its intention to
cancel existing BITs, and in 2013 it formally began the process of
terminating its BITs.24 To date, South Africa has terminated BITs with
the Netherlands, Spain, Luxembourg and Belgium, Germany,
Switzerland, and Austria.25
The Protection of Investment Act enacted in 2015 by South Africa26
now specifically excludes investor-state arbitration, and South Africa is
considering new BITs without an investor-state arbitration clause,
particularly with countries where it is exporting. The legislation also
calls for letting lapse current BITs that include investor-state arbitration.
While the official rationale for such moves is constitutional
requirements, it was only after some related legislation came under
threat from investor-state arbitrations that South Africa resolutely
moved away from BITs.
Moreover, the South African Development Community (“SADC”)
took the position in its Model BIT template with commentary that the
preferred option is not to include investor-state dispute settlement.27
Negotiations are currently under way at the African Union and United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa to design a Pan African
Investment Code that would likely result in a text that is close to the
features of the SADC model.28 The hope is that such a text would also
serve as a model for regional groupings and BITs involving African
countries.
iv. Indonesia
Indonesia has also denounced a slew of BITs and is drafting a new
model BIT, though it is unclear whether it plans to exclude investorstate arbitration from its new approach. Where it is able to terminate its
BIT obligations, Indonesia would be mostly reverting to domestic
remedies, with the applicable law including domestic rules and

in response).
23. Mossallem, supra note 20, at 10.
24. Id. at 12.
25. List of Treaties Terminated by South Africa, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/195 (sort by status) (last visited Oct. 9,
2017).
26. Protection of Investment Act (Act No. 22/2015) (S. Afr.).
27. SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, S. Afr. Dev. Community, Art. 29
(July
2012),
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-templatefinal.pdf.
28. U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, Draft Pan-African Investment Code (Dec. 2016)
https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/11444/draft-pan-african-investment-code-february-2017.pdf.
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customary international law.
Overall, then, there is a broad spectrum of positions amongst the
Global South regarding the pull back from traditional investor-state
dispute settlement. Few have radically foregone the traditional ISDS
format, and most seem to envision domestic recourses as a complement
to yet-to-be defined international processes.
B. Return to Diplomatic Protection? The Case of Brazil
In those countries denouncing BITs (South Africa, Indonesia, and
Ecuador, for instance) or declining to participate in them (as is the case
for Brazil), foreign investors may only rely on domestic law and
institutions, as explored above, and international customary law, which
might be vindicated through diplomatic protection. Traditionally,
diplomatic protection requires a private entity aggrieved by a foreign
state to call upon the state of its nationality to seek redress on its behalf
from the foreign state. The state is not obligated to provide protection.29
With respect to legal entities such as corporations, the International
Court of Justice held in the landmark Barcelona Traction case30 that the
state of incorporation, rather than the state of nationality of the
shareholders, would be the state in a position to offer diplomatic
protection. As Noel Maurer has extensively researched in the case of
Latin America,31 pressure from U.S. investors to persuade the state to
seek remedies on their behalf became severely burdensome on foreign
policy, and still failed to protect U.S. investments from expropriation
abroad. Ultimately, the United States and other major capital-exporting
countries found that the constant demands of diplomatic protection
impeded broader diplomatic strategies, and they created an avenue for
investors to seek direct recourse against the host state via international
arbitration.32
In the 1990s, Brazil signed fourteen traditional BITs and two
MERCOSUR Protocols on investment,33 but the BITs were never
29. John Dugard, Diplomatic Protection, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
1051–72, (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010); VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 197–99
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
30. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment, 1970
I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb. 5, 1970).
31. See generally NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S.
INTERVENTION TO PROTECT AMERICAN PROPERTY OVERSEAS 1893–2013 (2013).
32. See generally id.
33. Marcelo Gustavo Silva Siqueira, Brazil and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs),
SIQUEIRA CASTRO (Aug. 2014), http://www.siqueiracastro.com.br/informativos/Brazilian-LegalReport/2014/BLR-4-03.html (listing Brazil-Portugal BIT, Brazil-Chile BIT, Brazil-United
Kingdom BIT, Brazil-Switzerland BIT, Mercosur (Protocol of Colombia for protection of
investors from member states), and Mercosur (Protocol of Buenos Aires for protection of
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ratified. Brazil’s BITs included fair and equitable treatment, national
treatment, freedom of incorporation and management for international
investors, compensation standards for expropriations, free transfer of
capitals as profits and associated amounts cross-border, and investorstate dispute settlement mechanisms whereby the investor usually could
choose between arbitration or judicial remedies.34 Some treaties even
allowed investors to switch dispute-settlement mechanisms along the
way in some cases.35 Brazil also joined the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”). Subsequently, however, Brazil
retrenched from bilateral and multilateral investment negotiations and,
in response to concerns raised by the National Congress, would only
consider agreements guaranteeing the state’s right to regulate, excluding
indirect expropriation protection, excluding certain classes of assets
from covered investments (particularly portfolio investments), and
restricting avenues for dispute settlement for investors.36
Brazil’s new Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreements
(“CIFA”) envision a state-to-state dispute settlement process that is
reminiscent of traditional diplomatic protection. Such a move bucks the
trend of judicialization of foreign investment law over the past century.
It is therefore quite a radical response to emerging countries’ demand
for the protection of their policy space against norms of international
economic law perceived to be at times incompatible with their
development needs.37
Since 2015, Brazil has signed CIFAs with Angola, Chile, Colombia,

investors from non-member states) in 1994; Brazil-France BIT, Brazil-Finland BIT, Brazil-Italy
BIT, Brazil-Denmark BIT, Brazil-Venezuela BIT, Brazil-South Korea BIT, and Brazil-Germany
BIT in 1995; Brazil-Cuba BIT in 1997; Brazil-Netherlands BIT in 1998; and Brazil-BelgiumLuxembourg BIT in 1999).
34. See, e.g., Agreement between the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union and the
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments (Jan. 6, 1999), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/332;
Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Federative Republic of Brazil (Nov. 25, 1998),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/510.
35. Débora Bithiah de Azevedo, Os acordos para a promoção e a proteção recíproca de
investimentos assinados pelo Brasil, Estudo, Câmara dos Deputados, May 2001.
36. INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., REPORT ON THE FOURTH ANNUAL FORUM OF
DEVELOPING
COUNTRY
INVESTMENT
NEGOTIATORS
13–14
(2010),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_report.pdf.
37. In the Brazil-Mozambique and Angola contexts, this issue may be less salient because of
the history of trade and investment relations between the two countries. Additionally, Brazilian
investors may not be concerned about overreach by these African states, as they appear to be
comfortable with this new approach to investment protection. Whether such a model would
operate equally well in other circumstances remains an open question.
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Malawi, Mexico, Mozambique, and Peru,38 and has conducted
negotiations with South Africa, Algeria, India, Morocco, Nigeria,
Thailand, and Tunisia. This Section takes the Brazil-Mozambique CIFA
as an illustrative benchmark because it was the first such agreement and
subsequent ones include essentially similar mechanisms.
The Agreement establishes a Joint Committee composed of
government representatives appointed by each State. The Committee is
expected to meet at least once annually under an alternating presidency
to discuss implementation, work toward deeper coordination and
cooperation, and help to resolve disputes.39 Alongside the Committee,
the States are each to designate a domestic “Focal Point,” which is a
specific government agency tasked with offering support to investors of
the other State. The Focal Point liaises with other governmental
authorities domestically and with its counterpart in the other State.40
The Focal Point (at times also called “Ombudsman” in the CIFAs),
backed by the Joint Committee, also assists in the conciliatory
settlement of disputes.41 Despite the use of the term “Ombudsman,” this
process does not designate a neutral independent person to help resolve
disputes.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the “Ombudsman” model was
initially inspired by the Korean institution of a Foreign Investment
Ombudsman, established in 1999, which has enjoyed vast success in
resolving disputes outside of formal judicial or arbitral proceedings. The
office of the Ombudsman was created as a one-stop service to handle
grievances by foreign investors in Korea. The office of the Ombudsman
focuses on post-investment services for foreign investors in areas
covering finance, taxation, accounting, intellectual property rights,
construction, and labor. The Ombudsman is the head of the grievance
settlement body. Grievances are resolved through the direct deployment
of licensed and experienced experts to business sites and indirectly by
38. Bilateral Investment Treaties of Brazil, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu (last visited Jan. 22,
2018).
39. Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement, art. 4 (Mar. 30, 2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4717
[hereinafter
BrazilMozambique CIFA].
40. Other features of the CIFAs include provisions for engagement of the private sector and
civil society and corporate social responsibility. For example, the Brazil-Mozambique CIFA
creates opportunities for including the private sector at large (beyond the protected investors) and
civil society at the policy coordination level, at the implementation stage, and in dispute
resolution efforts. The main text of the treaty and a detailed annex spell out principles for
corporate social responsibility of investors. Although not worded as a strict obligation, its
inclusion in the treaty is remarkable because it is atypical.
41. Brazil-Mozambique CIFA, supra note 39, at art. 15.
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taking preemptive measures to prevent future grievances through
systemic improvements and legal amendments. The Ombudsman is
commissioned by the President on a recommendation of the Minister of
Trade, Industry and Energy, through the deliberation of the Foreign
Investment Committee.
Since 2010, the Ombudsman has been the Chair of Korea’s
Regulatory Reform Committee and also sits on the Presidential Council
on National Competitiveness (“PCNC”), thus ensuring that the opinions
of foreign investors are heard at the highest levels of policy-making
within Korea. The Ombudsman is empowered to directly contact heads
of ministries and government agencies for requests and
recommendations. The Ombudsman therefore plays a mix of alternative
dispute resolution intermediary, diplomatic, and political roles.
The Brazilian Ombudsman/Focal Point system, however, differs
substantially from the Korean model. The role is not embodied by a
person, but rather is envisioned as a committee with interministerial
representation.
While the agreements establish a process to encourage settlement of
disputes, only the governments of the states party to a particular CIFA
may trigger these procedures. In the Mozambique agreement, a dispute
must be officially initiated by the state party of the investor by filing a
request to the Joint Committee.42 The latter then has sixty days,
renewable by mutual agreement, to present relevant information and to
invite representatives of the investor, as well as representatives of
governmental and non-governmental entities involved in the dispute.
Following meetings as necessary to resolve the situation, the procedure
may be closed by request of either state party. If the dispute has not
been resolved, the state parties may then proceed to arbitration. Joint
Committee actions and documents remain mostly confidential.
The early CIFAs did not provide any details concerning the nature of
arbitration, other than to make clear that it was limited to state-to-state
disputes. Subsequent agreements signed with Latin American countries
have added substantial detail, although the agreements are rather varied.
Thus, the Mexico and Colombia agreements specify that the arbitral
tribunal for state-to-state disputes may determine damages and award
compensation,43 while other agreements are silent on this issue. All
42. Brazil-Mozambique CIFA, supra note 39, at art. 15.
43. Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos Entre a República Federativa Do
Brasil e a República da Colômbia, Braz.-Colom., art. 23, Oct. 10, 2015,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4714 [hereinafter Colombia CIFA];
Acordo de cooperação e facilitação de investimentos entre a República Federativa do Brasil e os
Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Agreement of Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments between
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provide a general framework for arbitration covering the number of
arbitrators, the use of World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules on the
conduct of arbitrators, and time limits for the arbitral proceedings.
However, they vary in the procedures for the arbitration and other
aspects.
Thus, although the legal conduit created by Brazil is different from
diplomatic protection, the Brazilian and Korean models share a core
political element due to the governmental nature of Joint Committees
and Focal Points.
II. HURDLES AND LIMITATIONS OF STATE-CENTRIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Moves away from investor-state arbitration, however, are fraught
with legal risks and political hurdles. This Section focuses on some
substantive and procedural legal issues. On the political front, obstacles
to ISDS reform may spring from private parties as well as states. For
instance, the vested interest from beneficiaries of the current system,
including established arbitrators and practitioners, will likely generate
resistance. Joost Pauwelyn has argued that the international investment
regime’s legitimacy crisis, and in particular critiques leveled at ISDS,
largely proceeds from a shift in the respective roles of the rule of law,
the rule of lawyers, and politics in procedural and substantive
frameworks.44 But inasmuch as a retreat from ISDS is meant to
rebalance public and private interests in favor of the state, we must
question whether a process giving the state increased power would
actually lead to more prominence of public interests. If states fail to
provide a consistent and legitimate legal framework for asserting the
preeminence of the public interests and dealing with clashes between
public interests and private property interests, then adjudicators,
regardless of who they are and how they are empowered or constrained,
have little reason to depart from current approaches.
A. Holdovers from the Past
With respect to South Africa and Indonesia, it must be noted that a
number of claims may survive the termination of BITs and still be
capable of being submitted to investor-state arbitration. Both
Indonesia’s and South Africa’s policy is to notify partners of its intent
not to renew BITs that reach the ten- or fifteen-year period for initial
Brazil and Mexico], Braz.-Mex., art. 19.2, signed on May 26, 2015,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4719.
44. Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment
Arbitrators are From Mars, Trade Adjudicators From Venus, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 761, 763–65
(2015).
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validity. The first South African treaties to lapse under this type of
sunset clause were the BITs with the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic
Union (2012), with Switzerland (2013), with the Netherlands (2013),
with Spain (2013), with Germany (2014), with Austria (2014), with
France (2014), and with Denmark (2014). South Africa also plans to
reconsider its BIT with China when the initial ten-year validity period
comes to term in 2018. Indonesia has terminated BITs with Norway
(2001), with Egypt (2014), with Bulgaria (2015), with China (2015),
with France (2015), with Italy (2015), with Lao People’s Democratic
Republic (2015), with Malaysia (2015), with the Netherlands (2015),
with Slovakia (2015), with Cambodia (2016), with Romania (2016),
with Turkey (2016), and with Vietnam (2016).45 Additionally, the
Indonesia-Argentina BIT was terminated by mutual agreement.46
Despite these numerous BIT terminations, survival clauses in some of
these treaties may continue to protect existing investments for a number
of years after the treaty has been terminated. This period varies from
treaty to treaty. For instance, the South African BIT with Belgium and
Luxembourg extends the coverage of the treaty for existing investments
for a period of ten years following termination of the treaty, 47 as does
the BIT with Denmark48 and Spain.49 The latter explicitly includes
dispute settlement provisions within the ambit of the survival clause.50
The South Africa-China BIT has a ten-year survival clause. The term of
the survival clause for the BIT with the Netherlands is fifteen years.51
The BIT with Austria provides a survival clause of twenty years,52 as
45. List of Treaties Terminated by Indonesia, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV.,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/97; (sort by status) (last visited Nov. 11,
2017).
46. Luke Eric Peterson, Indonesia ramps up termination of BITs – and kills survival clause in
one such treaty – but faces new $600 mil. claim from Indian mining investor, BILATERALS.ORG
(Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?indonesia-ramps-up-termination-of.
47. Accord entre l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et la République d’Afrique du
Sud concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements, Belg.-Lux.-S.
Afr., art. 12(2) (Aug. 14, 1998), 2218 U.N.T.S 3.
48. Agreement Between The Kingdom of Denmark and The Republic of South Africa
Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-S. Afr., art. 16.2 (Feb.
22, 1996; terminated Aug. 30, 2014), 2547 U.N.T.S 3.
49. Acuerdo para la Promoción y Protección Recíproca de Inversiones entre el Rieno de
España y la Repùblica de Sudáfrica, Spain-S. Afr., art. XII.3 (Sept. 30, 1998; terminated Dec. 22,
2013), 2098 U.N.T.S. 203.
50. Id. at art. XII.3, B.O.E. n.26.
51. Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the
Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Neth.-S. Afr., art. 14.3 (Sept. 5,
1995; terminated Apr. 30, 2014), 2066 U.N.T.S. 413.
52. Abkommen Zwischen der Regierung der Republik Österreich und der Regierung der
Republik Südafrika über die Förderung und den Gegenseitigen Schutz von Investitionen samt
Protokoll, Austria-S. Afr., art.12.3 (Nov. 28, 1996; terminated Oct. 11, 2014).
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does the BIT with France53 and with Switzerland.54 With respect to
these treaties, South Africa may be subject to investor-state arbitration
until as late as 2024, should a dispute arise regarding an investment
made before 2014 and protected by a treaty denounced in 2014 with a
twenty-year survival clause. Terminated Indonesian BITs also include
survival clauses: ten years for Cambodia, China, Italy, Laos, Malaysia,
Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Turkey, and Vietnam. The IndonesiaNetherlands BIT includes a fifteen-year survival clause. The IndonesiaFrance BIT is remarkable for its indefinite survival clause: Article 10
provides that in the case of termination, the provisions of the treaty shall
continue to apply to investments covered by the treaty and approved by
the parties prior to the denunciation.55 The possibility of disputes being
brought under expired treaties using survival clauses is not merely a
theoretical one. Indonesia notified India of its intent not to renew the
BIT between those two countries and the termination took effect in
April 2016; in the intervening period, Indian Metals & Ferro Alloys
Limited (“IMFA”) initiated arbitration proceedings against Indonesia
under the lame duck BIT in November 2015 for $560 million.56
With the issue of survival clauses now squarely in the limelight, other
countries seeking to denounce BITs, such as Indonesia, should be
carefully considering the limited effect of such moves with respect to
existing investments. It may be argued that in practice, an investment
that has gone trouble-free for several years is less likely to result in a
major investor-state dispute decades later. At the same time, it may be
that legislators in host states, thinking themselves free of the constraints
of denounced BITs and the related exposure to arbitral claims, may take
regulatory actions that are in fact still likely to trigger major arbitral
proceedings under the various survival clauses. Additionally,
developing countries’ poor tracking of the type of FDI, its origin and its
53. Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République Française et le Gouvernement de la
République d’Afrique du Sud sue l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des
investissements, Fr.-S. Afr., art. 11 (Oct. 11, 1995; terminated Aug. 30, 2014), 2055 U.N.T.S.
455.
54. Accord entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et le Gouvernement de la République d’Afrique du
Sud concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissements, Switz.-S. Afr, art.
13.2 (June 27, 1995; terminated Aug. 30, 2014), 2008 U.N.T.S. 103.
55. Accord entre l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et la République d’Afrique du
Sud concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements, Belg.-Lux.-S.
Afr., art. 10 (Aug. 14, 1998), 2218 U.N.T.S 3: “Au cas où le présent Accord viendrait à prendre
fin, ses dispositions continueront à s’appliquer aux investissements couverts par ledit Accord et
agréés par la Partie contractante préalablement à la dénonciation de cet Accord.”
56. Randy Fabi, Indian Metals and Ferro Alloys miner files $560 mln claim against
Indonesia,
REUTERS
(Nov.
18,
2015),
http://in.reuters.com/article/indonesia-imfaidINKCN0T70O320151118.
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nature may make it very difficult for governments to ascertain the
possible consequences of regulatory measures that could be seen as
indirect expropriation under traditional BITs. That landscape may be
even further complicated by investors who reincorporate and nominally
recast their investment to fall within the ambit of another treaty, which
might not yet have been denounced, or might offer a longer survival
clause.
South Africa’s and Indonesia’s moves also offer important lessons in
treaty drafting for those countries that are crafting new model BITs or
are currently negotiating investment agreements (bilaterally or as part of
regional trade agreements). A number of options could be considered.
First, survival clauses may be excluded altogether or dramatically
shortened. Second, survival clauses could be neutralized by mutual
agreement at the time of denunciation or termination of the treaty. This
technique was deployed by the Czech Republic57 and was also utilized
by Indonesia and Argentina.58 Third, survival clauses could extend to
the substantive rights and obligations under the BIT, but not to the
arbitration clause. It may also be prudent to exclude the MFN clause
from the ambit of any survival clause in order to avoid Maffezini-type
imports of dispute settlement provisions from other BITs. 59
B. Beyond Process: Substantive Law Considerations
Developing countries’ concerns with investor-state arbitration relate
in large part to the process as it currently exists, but their critique is also
leveled at substantive outcomes or the risk of certain outcomes in the
arbitration awards. Inasmuch as the rationale for rejecting or limiting
ISDS is to preserve host state autonomy, it might stand to reason that
reverting to domestic processes and the filter of the state through

57. Luke Eric Peterson, Czech Republic terminates investment treaties in such a way as to
cast doubt on residual legal protection for existing investments, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
REPORTER (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/czech-republic-terminatesinvestment-treaties-in-such-a-way-as-to-cast-doubt-on-residual-legal-protection-for-existinginvestments/.
58. Peterson, supra note 46.
59. In 2000, the tribunal in Maffezini v. Spain applied a BIT’s most-favored nation obligation
(“MFN”) to procedural issues relating to jurisdiction. The award shaped subsequent treaty
negotiations as well as other ICSID arbitrations. Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 (Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). More recently,
RosInvestCo v. Russia, a Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration, went even further by
using an MFN clause to broaden the types of claims that could be brought under a BIT when
another BIT signed by the host state included coverage for a wider range of claims. RosInvestCo
UK Ltd. v. Russia, Arb. V07/2005, Award on Jurisdiction (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber
of
Commerce
2007)
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0719.pdf.
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diplomatic protection and quasi-diplomatic processes such as those
delineated in the Brazil CIFAs would deliver such policy space.
However, reverting to diplomatic processes and domestic remedies may
not assuage all of the substantive concerns.
Indeed, considerations of policy autonomy and host states’ ability to
condition foreign investments depending on their domestic development
and regulatory priorities is framed by international investment law,
whether embodied in BITs, trade agreements, or customary
international law. Doing away with investor-state arbitration will not
change this framework. Letting BITs lapse—or actively denouncing
them—may help sidestep some objectionable language or
interpretations of BITs, but customary law will still apply.
Concerns about transparency, accountability, and recourses for
affected communities will only be improved if the domestic law of host
countries provides an adequate framework to protect such interests and
the means for implementing them. In many cases, foreign investments
involve a slew of contracts, agreements, letters, and other documents
exchanged between various host government agencies and the investor,
typically out of the public eye and not available for review. Chinese
investments in Africa and Latin America, for instance, are notorious for
the shroud of secrecy surrounding the specifics of the deals. Local
communities are typically not parties to these agreements, and their
legal standing to engage in the process ex ante or to seek remedies ex
post are often limited or nonexistent. Obligations on foreign investors to
generate social, economic, and environmental impact assessments,
subject to community scrutiny and public comment, may help but
ultimately fall far short of leveling the playing field between affected
communities and foreign investors in places where the state is unable or
unwilling to protect local interests. Domestic governance shortcomings
in host states create additional hurdles to the full expression of the
public interest.
If reinforcing the role and autonomy of the state is to truly police
foreign investment law, then home states must play a role in holding
their investors accountable for breaches of human rights, environmental
obligations, and other international law to which the home state has
subscribed. Indeed, the very notion of foreign investor suggests that the
investor falls within the jurisdiction of its home state; but almost
universally, little-to-no legal avenues exist to hold investors accountable
for their actions when those contravene the state’s international
commitments. Recourses could be envisioned under penal/criminal law
and tort law, particularly in monist countries, where international law
takes direct effect domestically, and in dualist countries where the
necessary domestic adoption measures have been enacted.
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Beyond such public law considerations—whether domestic or
international—José Alvarez argues that ISDS reform also needs to take
into account private aspects of the system, including the governance
power of private actors.60
CONCLUSION
To conclude, then, it will be interesting to monitor the continuing
efforts by the global South to develop alternative models for investorstate dispute resolution. While relying purely on state remedies, whether
diplomatic protection or domestic adjudication, is not a sufficient
response, it may help increase the pressure to critically reassess
investor-state arbitration processes. Ultimately, such arbitrations may no
longer be acceptable as the default option, but the plurality of
alternatives also reflects the lack of consensus on the way forward.

60. José E. Alvarez, Is Investor-State Arbitration ‘Public’?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
534, 573–74 (2016).

